Reconceptualizing transit states in an era of outsourcing, offshoring, and obfuscation by Missbach, Antje & Phillips, Melissa (R19498)
I





Reconceptualizing Transit States in an Era of 
Outsourcing, Off shoring, and Obfuscation
Antje Missbach and Melissa Phillips
  ABSTRACT: Th ere has been growing pressure on states to “solve” the phenomenon of 
irregular migration. Destination countries have transferred this pressure onto tran-
sit countries, which are assumed to have the political will, ability, and means to stop 
irregular migration. Th is special section looks at the ways in which transit countries 
respond to challenges, pressures, and compromises in matters of irregular migration 
policies through a number of empirical case studies. Making transit countries the main 
focus, this special section aims t o scrutinize domestic policy discourses in the transit 
countries, which are infl uenced by regional agreements and economic incentives from 
abroad but are also shaped by local interests and a wide range of actors. Of special inter-
est is to understanding whether the logics of destination countries that favor deterrence 
and exclusion have been adopted by politicians and the public discourse within transit 
countries. 
  KEYWORDS: borders, immobilization, irregular migration, migration control,  
migration industry, transit migration, transit state
Public interest in irregular migration is at an all-time high in many parts of the world. Conse-
quently, governments, policy makers, and international organizations are under considerable 
pressure to reduce the momentum of irregular migration and thereby demonstrate that they are 
in control of it. Notions of migration “crises” and migration “panic” are on the rise around the 
globe, not least because some potential destination states have chosen to actively fuel notions 
of panic through discourse and spectacle. Consequently, policy makers in the global North are 
increasingly shift ing part of the pressure to enforce border protections to neighboring countries, 
both countries of origin, and, more importantly for this special section, those that are deemed to 
be “transit states.” In brief, transit states can be understood as countries through which migrants 
and asylum seekers try to pass on their way to another destination country.
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State offi  cials from destination countries in the global North make both implicit and explicit 
demands for transit states to act as gatekeepers and bulwarks of irregular migration, thereby 
eff ectively outsourcing part of their management of migration (Gammeltoft -Hansen 2006; Tsia-
nos and Karakayali 2010; Wallace and Sidorenko 1999). Th rough a designation of transit states 
as both the problem and the solution to irregular arrivals, destination countries then design 
measures, such as policy and legal arrangements embedded with signifi cant fi nancial incentives, 
through which they exert ongoing pressure on transit states (De Haas 2008).
Destination countries increasingly expect the transit countries receiving such incentives to 
put in place migration and border controls and preemptive deterrence measures, but also asylum 
processing systems that will reduce their own long-standing policy questions about how to deal 
with unwanted irregular migration (Boswell 2003; Gammeltoft -Hansen 2012; McNamara 2013; 
Weber 2007). In this special section, we aim to push back against the rhetoric of destination 
countries, which claim to be overwhelmed by the numbers of people arriving on their shores 
when evidence points to the contrary. More signifi cantly, we direct attention to transit countries 
in the global South both to examine how they react to such external demands to become gate-
keepers and, more importantly, to understand the (self-)perceptions, conceptualizations, and 
discourses of transit that have developed over time within these Southern positionalities, which, 
as we argue in this special section, are very diff erent from the common understanding of “the 
transit country” developed for the European borderlands, such as Turkey or Ukraine (Düvell 
and Vollmer 2009; Içduygu and Yükseker 2012). Th e common understanding of “the transit 
country” has tended to focus on specifi c conditions, including, for instance, porous borders and 
corrupt authorities, an inability to process asylum applications and general lack of protection 
frameworks, and a high degree of instability coupled with a high likelihood of deportation. 
While the institutional contexts and domestic political-electoral pressures in potential destina-
tion countries have been examined in great detail in the literature (see, e.g., Heckmann 2016; 
Marr and Wilkinson 2003), less attention has been paid to such contexts and pressures in transit 
countries. Th is lack of grounded empirical knowledge of what is happening in spaces assumed 
to function as transit countries presents a challenge to politicians and policy makers trying to 
implement eff ective programs to immobilize irregular migrants, including asylum seekers and 
refugees in situ, and poses a number of challenging theoretical and epistemological questions to 
academics working in migration and refugee studies and related disciplines.
Some scholars working primarily on the migration trends within the context of the European 
Union (EU) have provided detailed overviews on the genealogy of the label “transit country” 
and how it has spread in policy circles to then be applied to ever wider geographic contexts 
beyond the EU (Düvell 2006; Düvell and Vollmer 2009; Düvell et al. 2014). In contrast, however, 
very little work exists on the intrinsic perceptions of those countries that have been labeled as 
transit countries by external policy makers, or that have adopted the transit country label for 
themselves but with slightly diverging meanings. Th e focus of this special section is thus on 
empirically interrogating the diverse ways in which “transit state” is deployed by conceptual-
izing the linkage between origin, transit, and destination countries, so that these diverse lived 
realities and heterogenous local contexts from around the globe can be used to shed new light 
on perceptions and implications of transit and transit states. In order to position our analysis 
on transit states in a wider context, we need to treat the relational, reversible, and complex rela-
tions between countries of origin, transit, and potential destinations with caution. We also tread 
carefully in presenting this work in an era of “migration panic,” where the word “migration” is 
most oft en confl ated with “crisis.” Here we intend to work against this notion by demonstrating 
how migration is an evolving phenomenon that is best served by refl exive and evidence-based 
analysis rather than rhetoric and knee-jerk reactions. Th is is essential, not least because the con-
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text and drivers of irregular migration in each transit state diff er to such an extent that simplistic 
migration management templates cannot easily be applied.
In order to analyze current developments, represented by a number of strategic case studies 
in this special section, we must fi rst, however, defi ne some of the key terms (e.g., destination 
country, receiving country, and country of origin) that we rely on here and retrace some of the 
scholarship that has evolved around transit migration over the last decades. While the process 
of transiting through several countries before reaching what is hoped to be a fi nal destination is 
not new, the term “transit migration” entered academic debates in the course of the expansion 
of the European Union into Eastern Europe. Prime targets for installing new border and asy-
lum policies were the new EU member countries known for their hitherto lax approach toward 
irregular migrants and their toleration of people passing through their territories widely unhin-
dered. From this point of view, in the European context, “transit country” was no longer just a 
descriptive denomination for a geographic entity; rather, it was reconceptualized into a tool of 
governance by potential destination countries (Oelgemoller 2011: 416). Despite the prolifera-
tion of both the terminology and the associated concept of transit migration among policy mak-
ers and academics across Europe, no widely accepted academic defi nition evolved of what in 
fact characterized transit migration per se, or a transit migrant or a transit state/country (Düvell 
2012; Papadopoulou 2004; Papadopoulou-Kourkoula 2008). So far, the best working defi nition 
is that off ered by Ann Kimball (2007), which is still widely used, criticisms notwithstanding, 
including by the authors of this special section. According to Kimball (2007: 12), four defi ning 
criteria determine whether or not a country qualifi es as a transit state: fi rst, transit states must 
border a “fully developed country”1; second, transit states must show a higher rate of emigration 
than immigration; third, transit states must function as primary staging grounds for migrants 
who intend to travel on to a nearby desired destination country; and fourth, over time transit 
states adopt and enforce more restrictive migration and border policies.
Instead of coining a new authoritative defi nition, many scholars who were compelled to 
study the coping mechanisms put forward by destination states to keep migrants on the move 
at bay limited themselves to criticizing inherent conceptual ambiguities of transit. In particular, 
the inability to suffi  ciently encompass all inherent complexities of migratory processes into a 
defi nition was widely bemoaned by the critics: aft er all, there were no fi xed or easily quantifi able 
parameters, such as the actual duration of journeys, legal statuses, intentions or hierarchies of 
intentions and actual outcomes of those journeys, which lend themselves to capturing the very 
nature of transit (Castagnone 2011; Düvell 2006; Kimball 2007; Transit Migration Forschungs-
gruppe 2007).
Due to the intense politicization of the term “transit migration” within the European migra-
tory regime that resulted from an obsession with wanting to secure the peripheries of the Euro-
pean Union, most critical scholars eventually tended to obviate the term altogether. Th is was 
because the term “transit migration” did not simply describe “an existing reality, but to some 
extent [was] also a part of the process of constructing that reality in such a way that discursive 
practices enable policy statements to conceptualise and talk about this phenomenon” (Içduygu 
and Yükseker 2010: 441). Within public discourse, policy makers who had associated the term 
with the need for manifold restrictive control mechanisms had gained the upper hand. Now—
almost a decade later—there is a noticeable revival of academic interest in studying transit 
migration outside of the European context (Busse and Vásquez Luque 2016; McDowell 2018; 
Tsourapas 2017; Willers 2018). Many of these scholars are trying to employ the term in a way 
that frees it from its Eurocentric ballast and the inherent connotations that oft en seemed to 
favor the increasing securitization and militarization of borders. When attempting to extend 
our knowledge on transit migration and people on the move, we assert that the way forward is 
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not to insist on honing epistemological fi nesse and overstressing the temporal scales and tempo-
rality of spaces of migration. Rather, when recapturing the political debate and individual theo-
retical positions therein, we want to contrast a number of fi xed assumptions about the political 
underpinnings of “transit state” with realities from across the global South that open up new 
understandings of what transit countries can be and how they react toward external pressures.
In turn, “destination country” has become a commonly used term to describe countries 
that are receiving migrants and refugees, although “receiving country” is also frequently used.2 
While these terms are oft en used interchangeably, the lack of consistency refl ects a wider prob-
lem in scholarship on irregular migration. In this special section we use “destination country” 
to describe a country that may be intended as an end point in an individual’s migration journey, 
whereas “receiving country” refers to all the spaces where irregular migrants can potentially 
end up. According to public and political imaginaries in the global North, most destination 
countries are located in the global North. Th ey are deemed to be desirable for migrants due to 
their strong standing in the global political economy. However, this public and political under-
standing needs to be challenged by actual fi gures, which clearly indicate that receiving countries 
are oft en outside the global North. More oft en than not, those countries that are understood to 
be “transit countries” are in fact receiving countries. Due to ever restrictive border and asylum 
policies, transit countries close to confl ict countries have, oft en against their own intentions, 
become fi nal destinations.
Finally, a country of origin usually designates the country where a person was born. As is the 
case for certain groups such as stateless persons or displaced people, this does not necessarily 
confer citizenship or equip him/her with equal rights to citizens. Also, the extent to which, if 
at all, a person considers the country of birth to be a “home” country (in an emotional sense) 
will depend, inter alia, on how long they have lived in that country, and under what conditions. 
Bearing in mind the staggered journeys that displaced people oft en undergo, which can include 
a range of countries of fi rst or secondary asylum, if not more, sending countries cannot nec-
essarily be equated with countries of origin. We have given preference to relying on the term 
“countries of origin,” simply because these are the places where asylum seekers whose claims for 
protection have been rejected and deported migrants will most likely be sent to. We note, how-
ever, that the term is being used as justifi cation by some countries to return or deport people to 
places they have no knowledge of; such is the case for many Afghan asylum seekers who have 
been denied refugee status and who, having grown up in neighboring countries such as Pakistan 
and Iran, fi nd themselves subject to return to a country they have never lived in (Schuster and 
Majidi 2013).
Empirical Realities and Global Developments 
Shaping Transit State Narratives
Th e crucial links between irregular migration and transit states are rarely interrogated in migra-
tion scholarship, especially using a global comparative approach. To address this gap, this special 
section brings together a collection of empirically based articles that question the expectations, 
role, and sociopolitical dynamics of a number of transit states around the world. Given that 
some countries in the global South have started to adopt the term “transit state” for their own 
purposes (see Missbach and Hoff staedter, this volume), our main focus is on transit states and 
their respective governments as signifi cant political entities and actors within the migration 
domain. Th is is important for many reasons, not least because there has been a privileging of the 
individual and collective decision-making practices of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees 
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and the diff erent degrees of uncertainty they experience (e.g., Baldwin-Edwards 2006; Basok et 
al. 2015; Collyer 2007; Gerard and Pickering 2014; Hugo et al. 2014; Missbach 2015; Sampson 
et al. 2016; Tazreiter et al. 2017) to the detriment of the wider context, which this special section 
seeks to address. While our collection pays attention to the micro level, encompassing mobile 
populations of women, men, children, and families, the main focus is directed at the state, its 
central and local authorities, as well as other competing actors on the local level. While the state 
(e.g., Indonesia) forms the meso level in our analyses, we also try to consider the macro level of 
migration management (e.g., Asia-Pacifi c).
As the contributors to this special section demonstrate, a wider picture of the intricacies of 
interaction, collaboration, collusion, terms of debate, and divergent views between potential 
destination countries and transit countries emerges from a focus on the roles of actors such as 
local, state/provincial, and federal governments and other stakeholders and decision makers 
based in transit countries. Th ese actors, who are oft en diffi  cult to study because of the political 
nature of their maneuvering and their more concealed presence in the fi eld, are examined in 
detail to represent a large variety of standpoints and multilayered interests. By expanding the 
analysis of irregular migration and turning attention to these actors as well as other sources such 
as policy documents and media reports, the contributors shed light on the bargaining power 
that transit states yield and the decisions they make in response to the expectations of ever-
demanding potential destination countries.
Exploring the empirical realities and recent political developments in selected transit coun-
tries highlights long-standing hegemonic power relationships and procured compliance in what 
are oft en unequal partnerships. However, the articles presented here reveal emerging forms 
of resistance against expectations that transit countries are willing gatekeepers for destination 
countries in the global North. We show that there is good reason to question not only the nature 
and implications of forced-upon collaborations but also their alleged “success” in holding back 
unwanted migrants. Th ose unwilling or reluctant gatekeeper transit states must be taken seri-
ously, as business-as-usual migration directives and programs fi nanced by potential destination 
countries may no longer be a valid option. Th is is because more and more transit countries 
are aware of their bargaining power and are beginning to prioritize their political and eco-
nomic interests linked to migration over the interests of other countries. One explanation is that 
migrants and refugees who are considered “undesirable” by potential destination countries are 
also rarely wanted by transit countries. In this way the label “transit migrant,” which brings with 
it the trope of illegality, has been successfully implanted in transit states with new consequences 
for how people are treated (Bredeloup 2012). By detailing trends within this global reordering 
of contemporary migration regimes, this special section seeks to challenge perceptions of power 
diff erentials between transit countries and other states. Among the transit states chosen as case 
studies—Ecuador, Indonesia, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, and Niger—only Libya “borders” the 
European Union (EU). Th ese case studies have been chosen to develop a comparative and global 
approach, and to explore what insights can be derived vis-à-vis “transit migration” precisely by 
viewing “it” from the South. By doing so we not only draw important lessons from a range of 
geographic contexts, but also avoid the theoretical Eurocentrism that is otherwise so dominant 
in discussions of transit migration (Düvell 2006; Suter 2017).
While numerous studies have theorized transit migration (Collyer and De Haas 2012; Dim-
itriadi 2018; Düvell 2012), the focus of this special section is on transit states, using an actor-
based approach to hone in on the role of local, state/provincial, and federal governments. It 
seeks to challenge widespread perceptions of “weak” transit states that are easily infl uenced in 
the negotiation of migration matters, even to their own detriment. For instance, all too oft en 
it is assumed that potential destination countries can simply force their externalized border 
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controls on transit states through what Amy Nethery and Carly Gordyn (2014: 178) call “incen-
tivised policy transfers” (see also Cosgrave et al. 2016; Lavenex 2006). Migration management 
incentives include targeted development aid, specialized training of key government agencies, 
and capacity building. Potential destination countries seeking to deter irregular migrants from 
arriving at their borders invest signifi cant resources in off shore and extraterritorialized poli-
cies in order to enclose, contain, and confi ne people far from destinations where they aspire 
to enter and seek asylum. For example, the provision of aid funds, such as the 2015 European 
Union–African Union Migration and Mobility Dialogue, and mobility partnerships, includ-
ing expedited accession to the European Union and fast-tracked visa processing for Turkey 
(Rygiel et al. 2016), are used to co-opt governments in transit countries into taking responsibil-
ity for migrants and refugees. Such interventions have far-reaching implications; they can harm 
migrants and violate their basic human rights and empower illicit and potentially dangerous 
political forces and actors. For example, Italy was alleged to have directly negotiated with mili-
tias involved in people smuggling in the south of Libya to reduce irregular migration (see M. 
Phillips, this volume). In turn, Ruben Andersson’s (2014, 2016, 2017) work on illegality along 
the West African corridor has demonstrated how border regimes create sites of transit onto 
which a logic of illegality is imposed and then “solved” through policies and vast sums of money 
that serve to boost an industry of government departments and private sector organizations, 
including those running immigration detention centers, to enact a “border spectacle.” As two of 
our contributors discuss, large sums of money have been spent in countries such as Niger and 
Libya on technological, fi nancial, political, and security measures that have in the past included 
detention centers and now focus on training and building the capacity of government depart-
ments, with questionable impact (see Moretti’s and M. Phillips’s articles, this volume).
While some transit countries, such as Libya, Morocco, and Turkey, have been subjected to 
intense empirical research (Brachet 2018; Bredeloup 2012; Collyer 2007; Içduygu 2000; Isleyen 
2017), other areas, such as heavily used migration pathways in the Americas and throughout the 
Asia-Pacifi c region, await similar academic engagement to provide a fuller picture of regional 
and global interdependencies when it comes to irregular migration. For example, while the 
EU can use its development strategies to press for more compliance with regard to migration 
issues in states that are benefi ciaries of EU funding (Brown 2017), in the Asia-Pacifi c region, 
Australia’s political reach does not give it a similar level of control over those whose compliance 
it desires. Whereas transit states such as Turkey and Libya may expect that their collaboration 
and compliance would result in the recognition of their regimes or more respect for their gov-
ernments, better aid delivery, and favorable trade deals, Indonesia has not had the same interest 
in increasing its political leverage with Australia, and has instead initiated a downgrading of the 
bilateral relationship. Malaysia has been a willing Australian partner at times, but has also made 
demands that run counter to Australian interests. In addition, the failed Malaysia refugee swap 
deal would have made Australia beholden to Malaysia in undesirable ways (see Missbach and 
Hoff staedter, this volume).
When it comes to political bargaining power, the two contributions of this special section that 
draw on case studies in the Americas portray rather diff erent reactions toward transit migra-
tion there. As Wendy Vogt (this volume) explains, Mexico and the United States have formed 
a complex and oft en contradictory relationship around the question of unauthorized migra-
tion. While Mexico has been openly critical of US immigration enforcement policies, it has also 
served as a strategic partner in US eff orts to externalize its immigration enforcement strategy. 
Compared to Mexico’s long history as a transit country and quite refi ned regulations (Kimball 
2007), Ecuador has more recently started the decision-making process on how to deal with 
incoming transit migrants, spurred by the arrival of people from countries such as Syria, Iraq, 
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Nigeria, Sudan, and Ghana. Ecuador’s decision making is heavily infl uenced by the externalized 
US border regime, yet a number of domestic inconsistencies, such as a progressive constitution 
that holds promises for “universal citizenship and free mobility” on the one hand and rather 
repressive migration laws on the other, have resulted in a highly selective system that controls 
transit mobility (Álvarez Velasco, this volume). 
As detailed in this special section, the variety of political outcomes in countries in the global 
South with regard to an increase in migrants in their territory and pressures from the global 
North challenges one-dimensional depictions of transit states as willing implementers of exter-
nal policy preferences. Moreover, an important fi nding of the contributors to this special section 
is to show how contested the policy-making process is, on a number of diff erent levels (local, 
regional, and national), and how policy makers, depending on the level they are operating on, 
may have confl icting and incompatible interests.
Expanding the Defi nition of a Transit State
Despite the rich scholarly debate on transit migration, few authors have tried to refi ne or fur-
ther develop the defi nition of what a transit state actually is. Instead, the defi nition (referred to 
above) that Ann Kimball off ered in 2007 is still widely used, assuming that onward migration 
does in fact happen eventually and that then transit becomes fi nite. More recently, transit has 
been conceptualized through the use of opposing metaphors of transit either as a cul-de-sac 
or dead-end road (Mountz 2017). In all such cases, transit is used in relation to both place and 
time and is almost exclusively reserved for irregularized migration paths with varying degrees 
of uncertainty and mobility risks (De Genova 2005).
We argue that there is a need for an agreed-upon defi nition of “transit state” as well as the 
contours of “the transit stage” to ensure more critical grounds for future debates. A renewed 
defi nition should not be so specifi c or rigid as to hinder comparative analysis, nor should it be 
an oversimplifi ed defi nition that is excessively concerned with being relevant in policy contexts. 
Rather, we aspire to a defi nition of transit that considers the ways that transit is historically 
produced and embedded in complex political, economic, and social dynamics between neigh-
boring countries. In particular, we therefore propose amending the fi rst criterion of Kimball’s 
defi nition of a transit state to acknowledge that they may not always border a “fully developed 
country” (a problematic construct in and of itself), but instead suggest a revised criterion that 
transit states are either proximate to a “developed” country or are a perceived gateway to a “devel-
oped” country. Th e fourth criterion, that over time transit states adopt and enforce more restric-
tive migration and border policies, should also be amended to refl ect that states themselves may 
not adopt or enforce more restrictive policies, but instead are very oft en the target of proposed 
restrictive migration and border management policies that transit states may engage with, selec-
tively implement, or resist. Finally, we also call for an expansion of Kimball’s defi nition to recog-
nize the fl uidity of transit states. Transit and transit states cannot be looked at in isolation from 
origin and destination. Th e multidirectional nature of migration movements has shift ed the way 
in which origin-transit-destination has been conceptualized, a point taken up next.
Reconceptualizing Origin-Transit-Destination
While it is important to recognize the global inequalities that underpin arrangements to render 
people immobile, the urgency of the transit debate and mounting political pressure brought 
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about by record numbers of people moving irregularly in many parts of the world have tended 
to reinforce rigid conceptualizations of origin-transit-destination that Bredeloup describes as 
being both mechanistic and reassuring (Bredeloup 2012: 460; Phillips and Missbach 2017b). 
In this schema, which is more oft en employed by destination countries, countries of origin 
are assumed to be poor, transit countries infl uenceable emerging economies, and destination 
countries wealthy and highly sought-aft er. Such a framework reinforces what have been seen as 
inaccurate portrayals of the contemporary political world through center-periphery models, as 
promoted by adherents of long-outdated world-systems theory, and is also based on contested 
defi nitions of destination and host country (Schapendonk 2017). Nevertheless, this framework 
is intentionally applied by actual and self-imagined destination countries to suit their political 
agendas and results in policy solutions that are focused on origin and transit countries to the 
convenience of destination countries. As will be discussed later in detail, we apply the term 
“destination” critically throughout this special section to emphasize its mythical nature; as the 
contributions here show, in reality the larger proportion of people moving irregularly do not 
reach, or are turned back from, so-called destination countries.
Th e result of this theoretical recidivism has been what Franck Düvell and colleagues (2014: 
21) describe as a “hierarchy of spaces,” and in the case of irregular migration, we see the depic-
tion of transit states as marginalized, manipulatable, and void of any local or regional political 
allies or alliances. As public policy discourse rages around porous borders and “uncontrolled 
migration,” there is a tendency for transit to be constructed as a space that can be managed, 
controlled, and acted upon from outside, for example, by measures such as readmission agree-
ments (Coleman 2009), covert turnbacks (J. Phillips 2017), or the “Remain in Mexico” pol-
icy (Vogt, this volume). Off shore processing arrangements and externalization measures are 
other examples that destination states will bear the oft en signifi cant fi nancial responsibility for, 
if such actions can take place in another geographical location (Mountz 2011). Th is implies, 
however, that transit countries have the political will, ability, and means to acquiesce to that 
pressure and intervention from outside and stop irregular migration. While concealing their 
selfi sh convenience with gatekeeper arrangements, policy makers and governments in “desti-
nation countries” claim that such early and externalized interventions will in turn create mutu-
ally benefi cial solutions for transit countries and potential destination countries, and even for 
the irregular(ized) migrants and asylum seekers who are prevented from taking risky onward 
journeys. At a local level this is a highly problematic assumption. For instance, in the case of 
Niger, when one considers the sizeable economy of smuggling, any attempts to stop irregular 
migration mean, as the president of the Regional Council of Agadez put it, that “Niger has 
a knife at its throat. Th e city’s only functioning economy was the movement of people and 
goods . . . Each smuggler supports a hundred families” (quoted in Moretti, this volume). Th e 
sudden erasure of smuggling will therefore result in economic consequences for those people 
who were used to stable incomes from smuggling, and addressing this job loss would need to be 
part of the postsmuggling economic plans for Niger.
Unilaterally directed migration management, created in policy centers and transplanted to 
transit states, thus assumes the agency of generous providers and grateful recipients, and yet 
the implementation of migration management packages requires political will and engagement 
at all levels of government in transit states. In their contributions on Niger and Libya, as noted 
above, Sébastien Moretti and Melissa Phillips alert us to the many obstacles on the ground that 
make the implementation processes challenging, if not impossible. For example, in the case 
of Libya, despite EU and bilateral eff orts to come to workable arrangements with government 
actors and key institutions such as the Ministry of Interior, Libyan authorities are reluctant 
for the country to become a holding destination for migrants, citing that countries of origin 
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also refuse to take people back (Middle East Online 2018). Additionally, the lack of coherence 
between various external agendas can lead to policy confusion on the ground.
“Destination country” has also become an all-too-convenient self-descriptor used by coun-
tries that wish to avoid their protection obligations toward people seeking asylum. Instead, these 
countries impose measures on those potential migrants they perceive to be seeking to irreg-
ularly depart from transit states. For example, the Australian minister for home aff airs, Peter 
Dutton, has commented that people smugglers will market countries such as New Zealand as 
a destination if pathways to settlement are provided for asylum seekers who are found to be 
refugees, which he described as a drawcard “putting sugar on the table” (Elton-Pym 2018). It 
then becomes assumed that border management policies are the only answer for destination 
countries and that these policies must begin in transit states. Th e generally oversimplifi ed ana-
lysis of the relationship between transit and destination countries perpetuated in both academic 
and policy discourse ignores the conceptual limits of the term “transit state” and the many 
instances in which transit states have pushed back and, in some cases, refused to be the willing 
executor of external policies or have rejected the implementation of externally conceptualized 
“problem-solving” mechanisms in their territory and territorial waters. Th is has become most 
apparent in the recent refusal by the governments of Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and 
Albania to build “reception centers” in their territories for migrants and refugees who are 
attempting to reach the EU (Al Jazeera 2018).
Beyond such outright refusals, there is increasing evidence that states are being pulled by 
both internal and external political pressures around questions of transit. In some cases, the 
long-term outcome and mutual benefi t of policy transfers remains highly questionable, as 
does, of course, their legality under international law. For example, as Antje Missbach and Ger-
hard Hoff staedter illustrate in this volume, the Australian government has provided lucrative 
funding, material incentives, and other support to combat people smuggling in Indonesia and 
Malaysia but has at times faced open refusal and more subtle forms of noncompliance by these 
countries. A current rise in nationalist sentiment in Indonesia is expected to make future turn-
backs of asylum seeker boats and maritime intrusions an even more sensitive matter for the 
Indonesian government. Similarly, the Mexican government faces increasing resistance over 
its role in facilitating outsourced United States immigration enforcement on Mexico’s southern 
border, especially since the election of Donald Trump (Vogt, this volume).
A central goal of this special section is to formulate a multipronged critique of the com-
mon assumption that transit states are easy to manipulate and that externalized migration 
management approaches are the “silver bullet” that will stop irregular migration within the 
“gateways” to Europe, Australia, the United States, and Canada. Although these countries have 
the thickest physical walls and the least penetrable virtual, biometric, and e-walls, “undesired” 
migrants and asylum seekers continue to arrive (Vogt, this volume). According to the logic of 
deterrence, the failure and challenges of migration control at national borders mean that more 
walls and obstacles need to be erected to interrupt the pathways early and prevent onward 
migration. Th e notion of transit states as gatekeepers raises questions about the politics of 
belonging and about which side of the imagined and factual border the gatekeepers stand, 
that is, whether they are positioned within the EU or not, or whether they—as an entire coun-
try—simply depict a new form of imagined border. Transit countries thus come to embody the 
border itself, serving as fi nal bulwarks in the seemingly endless attempt to stop movements 
early and far away from the physical borders of assumed destination countries. Th is not only 
creates additional distance and stretches waiting times for migrants and asylum seekers, but 
also means that many asylum seekers are unable to ever make their claims for international 
protection.
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Refuting Hierarchies of Categorization
In this special section we aim to challenge and leave behind the oversimplifi ed intentions of 
many policy makers who peddle the “win-win-win” argument by focusing on and taking seri-
ously the political interests and agendas generated within transit countries. We do this by draw-
ing on a range of empirical cases that include analysis of recent negotiations with neighboring 
receiving countries, shift ing policies, and alternative proposals for global or regional collabora-
tion with regard to questions of stemming transit. We aim, fi rst, to put in focus the political sig-
nifi cance of transit states and, second, to challenge the unquestioned hegemony of the potential 
destination countries as well as migration-related realities in those countries. In particular, we 
assert that the description of a country as a destination or receiving country oft en arises more 
from self-perception than reality, with increasing numbers of migrants remaining in transit 
states indefi nitely or returning “home,” more or less voluntarily, because of a lack of viable mid- 
to long-term prospects or rising xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiment (see Cherti and 
Grant 2013; Sampson et al. 2016; Vogt 2018; Zaazaa 2017). Th us, we endeavor to push back 
against the rhetoric of destination countries who claim to be overwhelmed by the numbers of 
people arriving on their shores when evidence points to the contrary (see, e.g., Edwards 2013).
Conceptions of origin-transit-destination do not bear scrutiny in a complex multipolar 
world. Th ese labels that once may have appeared to be neutral or even benign are now used as 
part of “ruthless political campaigns,” as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) has described campaigns against migrants and refugees (United Nations General 
Assembly 2018). Migration itself is a dynamic and multidirectional phenomenon, which oft en 
does not “end” in resettlement or permanent migration to a highly sought-aft er country (see 
Álvarez Velasco, as well as Missbach and Hoff staedter, this volume). A more nuanced approach 
to investigating the dynamic relationships between countries along certain migration corridors, 
as advanced in this special section, lends itself to an exploration of the layering of borders (Brown 
2017) and demands that attention be focused on the fl uidity and versatility of traditional send-
ing-transit-destination categorizations. By putting transit states at the center of our analysis, we 
open a discussion of their role in agenda setting and of their interests and strategic calculations 
within a highly interdependent global environment. To do this, the contributors consider the 
distinct migratory histories and legal traditions behind recent policy and legal changes (Álvarez 
Velasco), the complex political economies and cultural climates shaping transit (Vogt), and the 
need to take into consideration the local level in migration policy design (Moretti). Specifi c 
attention is paid to the evolution of law and policy in transit states in order to overcome the 
ahistorical approach in the transit debate and to demonstrate how local conditions determine 
the viability of a policy transfer (M. Phillips, as well as Missbach and Hoff staedter).
Conclusion
Th is special section demonstrates that there is an urgent need to engage critically with concepts 
created and mobilized by European states, including the term “transit state.” One way of review-
ing underlying assumptions and biases is to place the global South at the center of analysis, 
as this shift  in perspective helps make visible how unrealistic certain political demands and 
expectations are. Th e analysis of transit states presented in this special section provides three 
dimensions that migration scholars interested in transit migration may seek to engage with in 
their future studies: economic side eff ects of incentivized policy transfers; possible legal reper-
cussions encountered by destination countries that deny asylum seekers the basic human right 
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to seek asylum; and mechanisms that would increase transit countries’ responsibilities toward 
protecting incoming migrants.
First, a more comprehensive defi nition of transit that goes beyond policy jargon is essen-
tial to capture other migration-related phenomena in transit sites, for example, transit-related 
forms of commercial activity. As has been noted elsewhere, transit environments fuel lucrative 
industries (Andersson 2014) that generate income from servicing the needs of smugglers, ser-
vice providers, and state-fi nanced countersmuggling agencies. Other actors involved in transit 
states, such as international organizations and supranational border security agencies (such as 
Frontex), also benefi t signifi cantly by off ering humanitarian interventions funded by sizeable 
migration management programs. Although the operations of organizations running programs 
in transit states may be framed as life-saving and humanitarian work, they restore and main-
tain the border logic imposed by wealthier states and exclusive regional bodies. Conversely, 
as the case of Niger demonstrates, countries of transit may also benefi t considerably from the 
migration business, which means that any attempt to curb migration can negatively aff ect their 
economy (Moretti, this volume). A focus on comparing the political economies of transit coun-
tries (e.g., Phillips and Missbach 2017a) would appear to be a way to improve theorization of 
the phenomenon.
Second, when studying transit states and outsourced and extraterritorial activities imple-
mented or fi nanced by potential destination countries, more attention needs to be given to 
legal implications, human rights responsibilities, and criminal liabilities. For example, Aza-
deh Dastyari and Asher Hirsch (forthcoming) have examined in detail the implementation of 
extraterritorial policies, in the case of Italian and Australian policies toward Libya and Indone-
sia, respectively, which among others include the fi nancing of immigration detention centers 
where numerous rights violations occur with the full knowledge and intention of the sponsors. 
In some instances this fi nancing has been under the guise of foreign aid or funding diverted 
from aid budgets toward immigration controls. Both Australia and Italy have engaged in var-
ious ways with the transit countries of Indonesia and Libya to deter the onward movement of 
migrants and refugees, and the resulting human rights violations are well-documented (Phil-
lips and Missbach 2017a). Th erefore, the label transit state has a twofold implication. It is used 
by other countries to justify their interference in states interpellated as transit states, and, in 
turn, as noted below, can be embraced by transit states themselves to reinforce the dominant 
notion that a transit state is a place where migrants do not wish to stay in order to justify why 
they are not implementing policies or are ignoring their presence. Th e legal liability for exter-
nalized actions of destination countries remains a key area for comparative research, especially 
across multiple jurisdictions.
Finally, any reconceptualization of transit should also recognize that, in the past, the term 
was primarily used by destination states to refer to other countries considered useful in the 
implementation of migration controls (Düvell 2006, 2012). As noted above, however, there has 
been a shift  in discursive ownership of the term, as it has been increasingly appropriated by 
so-called transit countries for diff erent political purposes. For example, some contributors to 
this special section have encountered incidents in the fi eld of local politicians arguing that they 
are not responsible for the well-being of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees because they 
are only passing through. For instance, Agung Sampurno, spokesman for the Indonesian Direc-
torate General of Immigration, has been quoted as saying “Indonesia is only a transit country, 
to accommodate migrants to their destination country. If the U.N. asks us to make it perma-
nent, Indonesia can’t do that” (Cochrane 2018). By making statements like this, states wash 
their hands of any responsibility for protecting the rights of people in transit and people mov-
ing through transit states and ignore the lack of both regular and irregular options for onward 
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migration. Such statements also highlight a lack of political will to take responsibility for immo-
bilized people in those states, thus defl ecting tasks arising from their immobility to other stake-
holders, such as international organizations and NGOs.
As we have stressed throughout this introduction, terminology matters deeply in discussions 
about transit migration, transit migrants, and transit states. Contributors to this special sec-
tion variously refer to transit states and transit countries, depending on local contexts and on 
whether they are referring primarily to geographic spaces or to forms of governance. Similarly, 
while it is well-known that asylum seekers, migrants, deportees, and refugees are specifi c legal 
categories of persons, many authors have preferred to use the label “migrants” for all groups of 
persons on the move in a transit context. What comes to the fore in all the contributions is that 
the growing prevalence of irregular migration is a direct result of the imposition of restrictions 
on legal migration through barriers, walls, security, and surveillance measures and deterrents. 
Th us, migration itself has become widely irregularized. Th e impact of these restrictions has not 
resulted in any tangible improvement either to the conditions that migrants and refugees on the 
move experience or to adherence to human rights conventions intended to govern their treat-
ment. It is hoped that this special section will promote further critical refl ection on expanded 
defi nitions of transit and new ways of thinking about transit states from the vantage point of 
diverse state and nonstate actors in the global South.
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interconnections.
 1. Kimball does not elaborate on the defi nition of a “fully developed country”; however, it is assumed 
to mean a country in the global North that is considered to be a more attractive destination than the 
transit country due to perceived economic opportunities and legal protections.
 2. Notwithstanding, the terms “destination countries” and “receiving countries” have their historical 
antecedents in economic conceptualizations of the status of countries as producers of goods for cap-
italist markets. For more see Piché (2013).
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